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Mortgage Interest and Property Tax Deduction:
A Tax Expenditure
Analysis
Richard Pomp
If the government decides to subsidize the mort-
gage interest and property tax paid by homeowners
it can do so by providing them with a direct subsidy
or a tax deduction. In this article, Professor Pomp
reviews the criteria that should be applied in making
this choice. He concludes that a heavy burden rests
on those who would argue in favour of a tax deduc-
tion and that in this case they have not discharged it.
He also examines the important social and economic
consequences of subsidizing mortgage interest and
property taxes.
The tax expenditure concept is a powerful analytical
tool that has changed traditional ways of thinking about
the income tax and the government spending process. The
income tax has now come to be viewed as consisting of
two parts. The first part contains those provisions which
are required to implement a proper tax on net income. The
second part contains those provisions which are intended
to implement social or economic goals by providing finan-
cial assistance to select activities or taxpayers. The latter
provisions, which are extraneous to the normative struc-
ture of the income tax, include special exclusions, deduc-
tions and credits that reduce or defer the recipient's tax
liability. Since these special provisions represent a form of
government spending that is equal in amount to the taxes
that would otherwise be collected, they have been termed
"tax expenditures." To put it another way, any tax expend-
iture can be viewed as if the taxpayer had actually paid the
full amount of tax owing in the absence of the special
provision and had simultaneously received a grant equal to
the savings provided by the special provision. Viewed in
this manner, a tax expenditure is just one of a number of
ways of providing governmental assistance; other means
include direct grants, subsidies, and loans.'
Because a tax expenditure is a form of government
spending, any program implemented through the tax
system can be translated into an equivalent direct spending
program. Once translated into its spending analogue, a tax
expenditure can then be analyzed in the same manner as
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any direct spending program - in terms of how much
money is being spent, how this money is distributed,
whether the desired goals and objectives are being accom-
plished, and other similar budget criteria.
Tax expenditure analysis can provide a good deal of in-
sight into the two tax deductions that are being proposed
by the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada: a
deduction for home mortgage interest and a deduction for
real property taxes. These deductions are apparently being
proposed in order (1) to provide financial assistance to
homeowners; (2) to assist tenants in purchasing homes;
and (3) to stimulate the depressed construction industry.
Thus, since the proposed tax changes are being justified
not by reference to principles underlying the normative
structure of the Canadian income tax, but by reference to
more general social and economic objectives of govern-
ment, subjecting them to a tax expenditure analysis is ap-
propriate.
Both of the proposed deductions have existed in the
United States since the earliest days of the income tax. But
in that country both deductions are part of two more
general provisions: one that provides for the deduction of
all interest, including interest incurred for non-business
purposes, and another which provides for the deduction of
all state and local taxes, including property taxes.
Although neither of these general provisions were
originally adopted to promote housing, both deductions
are now defended on these grounds. 2
Tax Expenditure versus Direct Expenditure
A tax expenditure analysis of these deductions raises
serious objections to their serving as part of a housing
program. As tax expenditures, they have been attacked in
the United States as being costly, inequitable, and ineffi-
cient. These criticisms are equally relevant to the Canadian
proposals.
Cost. In 1978 the American government spent ap-
proximately $5.5 billion on the deduction for property
taxes paid on owner-occupied homes and $7.6 billion on
the deduction of mortgage interest. In contrast, the
23
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government's direct expenditures on housing programs
were approximately $3 billion.' Ironically, the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue outspent the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development with respect to housing
programs.
Equity. Unlike the assistance provided by most of the
direct housing programs in the United States, which are
available primarily to the needy, the assistance provided by
the property tax and interest deductions is distributed in a
perverse and inequitable manner. The higher an in-
dividual's income, the higher his or her marginal tax rate,
and thus the greater the benefit of the deductions. Con-
versely, the lower an individual's income, the lower his or
her marginal tax rate, and the lower the benefit of the
deductions. Indeed, an individual who is too poor to pay
any income tax receives no benefit whatsoever from the de-
Correcting the defects inherent in using a
tax expenditure ultimately requires some
type of direct expenditure.. .The logical
question, therefore, is why a tax expen-
diture should be used at all.
ductions. Moreover, the deductions can become worthless
at the time they are most needed. For example, an individual
who becomes ill or unemployed during the year, or other-
wise has a sudden and unexpected drop in income, may
have no taxable income. Thus even though he or she is
committed to both mortgage and property tax payments ,
and needs assistance now more than ever, the tax deduc-
tions will be of no value to him or her. It is difficult to
imagine a direct spending program being adopted which
had such a feature.
In view of the perverse manner in which the benefits of
the deductions are distributed and of the fact that the in-
cidence of home ownership rises with income, it is not sur-
prising that the richest 10 per cent of American taxpayers
receives 73 per cent of the benefits of the mortgage interest
deduction and 79 per cent of the benefits of the property
tax deduction.' Indeed, the yearly income tax savings for
households with annual incomes of $50,000 or more are
nearly as great as the yearly benefits provided to low-rent
public housing.' Would any politician have the audacity to
propose a direct spending program having these charac-
teristics?
The "upside-down" effect of the tax expenditures
would be eliminated if the deductions were replaced by tax
credits equal to a percentage of an individual's property
taxes or mortgage interest. A tax credit would give equal
tax benefits to taxpayers having the same amounts of
property taxes or mortgage interest and the tax benefits
would be independent of the individuals' marginal tax
brackets. If giving less assistance to rich taxpayers than to
poor taxpayers were thought to be desirable, a vanishing
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credit could be adopted; that is, a credit which decreased in
amount as the taxpayer's income increased.
Although a credit is more equitable than a deduction, it
is of no benefit to an individual who is too poor to pay any
income tax (or whose liability is less than the credit), unless
the credit is refundable. A refundable credit, however,
would constitute a direct expenditure. Correcting the
defects inherent in using a tax expenditure ultimately
requires some type of direct expenditure, such as a refund-
able credit. The logical question, therefore, is why a tax
expenditure should be used at all. In other words, why
should not the tax system be by-passed at the outset by
adopting a direct expenditure program?
Efficiency. Not only are the deductions costly and
inequitable, but they are also an inefficient means of en-
couraging home ownership. One source of inefficiency is
derived from the upside-down manner in which the tax
savings are distributed. Upper-income taxpayers, who
derive the most benefit from the deductions, would very
likely own homes even in the absence of the incentive.
Lower-income tax-payers who need a financial incentive to
purchase a home, benefit the least.
Another source of inefficiency is the lack of any restric-
tions on the amount of the deductions. All mortgage in-
terest and all property taxes are deductible, regardless of
the size, price, or location of the home, the amount of the
mortgage, or the number of homes owned.! A direct spend-
ing program would most likely have safeguards to ensure
that the program was not abused.
Although nearly all economists agree that the interest
and property tax deductions are inefficient in encouraging
home ownership,' little agreement exists about the impact
of the deductions on the American housing market. These
deductions, like many other tax expenditures, have never
been subjected to periodic government review. A few
private economists have studied the impact of the deduc-
tions on housing, but their studies' differ in their method-
ologies and are rather inconclusive.II Furthermore, for the
purposes of comparison, the American experience might
not be relevant in Canada, since the U.S. deductions have
existed since 1913. The American experience is certainly of
little value in predicting the short-term impact that the in-
troduction of these deductions would have on the
Canadian housing market and on Canadian mortgage
rates." In any case, these economic studies have already
been reviewed in the Canadian literature" and elsewhere
and therefore will not be pursued here.
Renters versus Homeowners
In defense of the proposed deductions, supporters argue
that tenants already benefit from the deduction of mort-
gage interest and property taxes by their landlords, and
that it is only fair, therefore, to extend these deductions to
homeowners.I The fallacy in this argument is easily ex-
posed if one considers that landlords can deduct all of their
business expenses. Because landlords can deduct the cost
of hiring someone to clean the hallways of their apartment
CANADIAN TAXATION / FALL, 1979
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buildings, or the cost of hiring gardeners, should
homeowners also be able to deduct similar costs? Land-
lords get the deduction because they are in the rental
business - homeowners are not.
To put the matter another way, if a landlord's rental in-
come were not taxed, no reason would exist for granting
him or her a deduction for property taxes, mortgage in-
terest, or any other business expense. If tenants somehow
benefit because their landlords deduct mortgage interest
and property taxes, tenants must also benefit because their
landlords are taxable on rental income. Yet, to the extent
that the level of rents reflects the tax burden imposed on
rental income, how do tenants benefit (all other things
being equal) because rental income is taxable? To be sure,
the tax burden on rental income would increase if land-
lords could not deduct property taxes, mortgage interest,
as well as their other expenses. This result, however,
does not lead to the conclusion that homeowners should
be allowed to deduct their property taxes and mortgage in-
terest. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that the
burden on rental income is greater under a gross receipts
tax (that is, an "income tax" that does permit the deduc-
tion of business expenses) than under an income tax levied
at the same rate.
If homeowners were required to treat as taxable income
the net rental value of their homes, then allowing them to
deduct property taxes and mortgage interest would make
some sense. The taxation of homeowners on the net rental
value of their homes would recognize that a person has a
choice between purchasing assets, such as stocks or bonds,
that provide monetary income, and purchasing a home
that provides services. A person who resides in his or her
own home obtains income in the form of consumer ser-
vices. In other words, a homeowner acts in a dual capacity
- as an investor, a role in which he or she acts as landlord,
and as a consumer, a role in which he or she acts as tenant.
In many countries, though not in the United States or in
Canada, this dual capacity is recognized by the tax law, by
taxing the homeowner on his or her imputed income as a
landlord.'I
... a homeowner acts in a dual capacity
- as an investor, a role in which he or
she acts as landlord, and as a consumer,
a role in which he or she acts as tenant.
The equity of taxing homeowners on the imputed rental
value of their homes can be illustrated by an example.
Consider two individuals, X and Y. Assume that each earns
an annual salary of $20,000 and has cash savings of
$40,000. Y invests $40,000 in securities that generate in-
come of $4,000 and rents a house for $7,000. X purchases
a $40,000 home that is identical to Y's rented home. If X's
housing costs - property taxes, insurance, repairs, depre-
ciation, and so forth - total $3,000, X has an imputed net
rental income equal to $4,000 ($7,000 of imputed gross
rental income less $3,000 of business expenses).' 5
Although X and Y both own assets of $40,000, live in
identical surroundings, and have identical before-tax cash
flows of $17,000, their tax liabilities are different." Y has
to include the $4,000 of income from the securities in
taxable income, whereas X does not have to include the
$4,000 of imputed net rental income in taxable income. To
put it another way, if Y were to sell the securities and use
the proceeds to purchase the home that is now being rented,
Y's economic status would remain unchanged, but his or
her tax liability would decrease."
If imputed net rental income were taxable, homeowners
would be taxed in their capacity as landlords and a deduc-
tion for their property taxes and mortgage interest would
then be proper. But because no one in Canada is
proposing that imputed rental income be taxed,"' deduc-
tions for property taxes and mortgage interest cannot be
... even without deductions for property
taxes and mortgage interest, the income
tax may already contain tax expenditures
that favour homeownership.
justified by analogy to the business deductions available to
landlords. Furthermore, if the taxation of imputed net ren-
tal value is viewed as part of the normative structure of an
income tax, which is a common view of most Canadian
and American tax specialists,"' then the exclusion of this
imputed income already represents a tax expenditure for
homeownership.20 Granting deductions for property taxes
and mortgage interest would add yet another tax prefer-
ence for homeownership.
The possibility that the exclusion of imputed net rental
income is a tax preference serves as a reminder that, even
without deductions for property taxes and mortgage in-
terest, the income tax may already contain tax expend-
itures that favor homeownership. For example, in
Canada all of the profits arising from the sale of a home
are exempt from tax.21 Again, a tenant who chooses to in-
vest in securities rather than in a home is treated more
harshly in that a capital gains tax will be paid on the sale of
his or her investment.
Another Canadian tax expenditure is the registered
homeownership savings plan (RHOSP),2 2 which allows an
individual to save $1,000 per year tax-free for the purchase
of a home. The $1,000 is deducted from taxable income,
subject to a lifetime ceiling of $10,000. The funds can be
withdrawn from savings tax-free as long as they are used
to purchase a home. Since gains on the sale of a home are
exempt from taxation, no tax will ever be paid on these
funds.
... the proplosed deductions would be
costly, inequitable, and inefficient,...
Although the preceding tax expenditures bias the tax
system in favor of homeownership, other tax provisions
that favor rental housing may offset this bias. For exam-
ple, Canadian and American investors in rental housing
are eligible for liberal depreciation deductions that are
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probably in excess of true economic depreciation. To the
extent that these liberal depreciation deductions result in
lower rents, individuals are encouraged to rent, rather than
to purchase housing.
The impact of these depreciation deductions on the level
of rents is difficult to measure. Unlike a tax expenditure
for owner-occupied housing, whose recipient is both in-
vestor and consumer, the tax expenditure for rental
housing is paid to the investor-owner and not to the
consumer-tenant. The extent to which the tax savings are
passed through to the tenant must therefore be estimated.23
The empirical data are sketchy because few of the
economists who have studied the tax expenditures for
homeowners have focused on the tax expenditures for ren-
tal housing. It is generally agreed, however, that in the
United States excess depreciation deductions represent tax
expenditures of less than $300 million." They are thus
overshadowed in amount by the tax expenditures for
owner-occupied housing.
In addition to generous depreciation deductions for ren-
tal housing, the American tax system, though not the
Canadian, contains another provision that may restore
somewhat the balance between tenants and homeowners.
Every American taxpayer has the option of either itemizing
his or her personal deductions, which include interest,
property taxes, charitable contributions, medical expenses,
and casualty losses, or deducting a fixed amount called the
standard deduction.25 Because the standard deduction is
relatively high ($3,400 for married couples filing a joint
return and $2,300 for single persons), only 23 per cent of
all taxpayers itemize their deductions;28 most tenants use
the standard deduction. An individual who chooses to
itemize and thereby deducts property taxes and mortgage
interest receives the benefit only of the amount by which
his or her total deductions exceed the amount of the stan-
... the deduction... helps to differentiate
between homeowners with mortgages
and those without. Because imputed in-
come is not taxable, however, the price
paid for this differentiation is a further
increase in the discrimination between
homeowners and tenants.
dard deduction to which he or she would otherwise have
been entitled. The standard deduction thus helps to offset
the benefits that homeowners receive from deducting their
property taxes and mortgage interest." Since there is no
similar Canadian tax deduction, the discrimination bet-
ween homeowners and tenants would be much greater in
Canada if property taxes and mortgage interest were
deductible.
Defending the Deductions
Because the Canadian income tax already contains tax
expenditures that favor homeownership and because the
proposed deductions would be costly, inequitable, and
inefficient, what can be said in their defense? First, the
deduction for property taxes can be defended as an aid to
intergovernmental fiscal relations. The deduction increases
the taxing capacity of local governments, mitigates dif-
ferences in the level of taxation among provinces and
municipalities, and helps prevent the combined rate of
local and federal taxes from approaching 100 per
cent of income.28 Second, to the extent that the payment
of the property tax can be characterized as an obligatory
Assuming... [that] encouragement of
homeownership is desirable, a tax ex-
penditure analysis of any proposal that
would be implemented through the tax
system,... is fully warranted. The
proposed deductions are not the only
alternatives for promoting homeowner-
ship.
payment, rather than as a discretionary item of consump-
tion,29 the deduction recognizes the individual's reduced
taxpaying capacity. Under either of these rationales,
however, all provincial and local taxes should be deducted,
not just property taxes. Offering a deduction only for
property taxes may result in a serious shift in the present
mix of local taxes, because it will create pressure to impose
or increase property taxes rather than sales or income
taxes."0 Since the property tax might not be as progressive
a tax as the income tax or the sales tax, it is questionable
whether the federal government should adopt a proposal
that biases local financing decisions in favor of a regressive
form of taxation.
The case in favor of allowing a deduction for mortgage
interest is more complicated. The normative income tax
treatment of interest has not yet been fully developed,
though many commentators apparently view the deduc-
tion for interest on consumer credit as a tax expenditure."1
No one in Canada, however, is defending the proposed
deduction for mortgage interest as a change in the nor-
mative structure of the Canadian income tax.32 In the
narrower context of homeownership, the most that can be
said in support of the deduction is that it helps to differen-
tiate between homeowners with mortgages and those
without. Because imputed income is not taxable, however,
the price paid for this differentiation is a further increase
in the discrimination between homeowners and tenants.33
Conclusion
Nothing in the preceding tax expenditure analysis pur-
ports to answer the question whether the government
should provide financial assistance to homeowners. That
question is appropriately left to the political arena.
Assuming, however, encouragement of homeownership is
desirable, a tax expenditure analysis of any proposal that
would be implemented through the tax system, such as the
CANADIAN TAXATION / FALL, 197926
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proposed deductions for mortgage interest and property
taxes, is fully warranted.
The proposed deductions are not the only alternatives
for promoting homeownership. Among others are direct
grants, construction loans, mortgage guarantees, and in-
terest subsidies. Each of these alternatives is likely to have
different distributional and economic effects. Evaluating
these other approaches will raise various fundamental
questions that have not yet been raised. For example, what
type of housing plan does the government want? Should
the government influence the demand for housing or the
supply of housing? Should assistance be directed toward
new housing or toward existing housing? Should the
government intervene directly in the credit market? Should
benefits be directed toward the poor, toward large
families, or toward the elderly? Should low-quality
housing be upgraded?
If, after a full exploration of these issues, a subsidy for
mortgage interest and property taxes emerges as the most
desirable of the alternatives, the burden of proof should
still be on those who want to provide that subsidy through
the tax system. The question that must then be asked is,
"What clear advantages are there in using the tax system
to provide the financial assistance." Only when that
question has been answered satisfactorily can a responsible
and well-informed choice be made.
* The author is indebted to Michael J. McIntyre, Professor
of Law, Wayne State University, for his many helpful
suggestions and comments.
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fore increase the difference in tax treatment between homeowners
and renters.
CANADIAN TAXATION / FALL, 1979 29
